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The paper investigates how resilience can be understood as an operational paradigm for system management from 
a multistage decision making perspective. Specifically, agents involved in the resilience management aim at an 
optimum process of sequential preparedness/protection, emergency response, recovery, and adaptation activities, 
trading off the loss due to lack of system functionality with the needed investment. Agents’ decisions are made 
sequentially aiming at minimizing the overall system loss in the presence of numerous uncertainties in the intensity 
of the disruption, post-disruption demand, repair durations, etc. We restrict the actions to only depend on uncertain 
parameters realized up to the current decision period. This process can be formulated as a multi-stage optimization 
problem. We discuss how the linear decision rule approximation can be used to overcome the curse of the compu-
tational complexity of the problem and to derive operationally implementable policies. By referring to a simple 
example of a notional infrastructure, we demonstrate that the proposed approach helps providing a holistic view of 
resilience management and deriving optimal actions and policies for resilience enhancement. 
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1. Introduction  
Resilience has emerged in the last decade as a key 
desired attribute of infrastructure systems (ISs, 
e.g., power grids, communication, transport, wa-
ter distribution networks, etc.) exposed to poten-
tial disruptive events, e.g., natural hazards, acci-
dent failures or intentional attacks. The US Na-
tional Academy of Science defines the concept of 
resilience as “the ability of a system to prepare 
and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more suc-
cessfully adapt to actual or potential adverse 
events” (Cutter et al., 2013). 
Many efforts have been made in the engineer-
ing community for assessing the resilience of ISs 
in quantitative and rigorous ways. The majority of 
the studies are based on either the idea of estimat-
ing the inoperability of an IS following a cata-
strophic event by leveraging historical event data 
(Nateghi, 2018; Nateghi, Guikema, & Quiring, 
2011), or the idea of predicting the time-depend-
ent trajectory of the IS functionality under disrup-
tion through system operational models (Ouyang, 
Dueñas-Osorio, & Min, 2012; Panteli & 
Mancarella, 2017). Some scholars studied how to 
measure the resilience of interconnected ISs aim-
ing to model the failure propagation across differ-
ent systems (Fang & Zio, 2019a, 2019b; Liu, 
Ferrario, & Zio, 2017; Ouyang & Wang, 2015; 
Pant, Barker, & Zobel, 2014). Recently, fairly 
comprehensive surveys of the growing literature 
on resilience assessment have been provided for 
general ISs (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-
Marquez, 2016) or specific systems like power 
grids (Wang, Chen, Wang, & Baldick, 2016) and 
transportation (Faturechi & Miller-Hooks, 2014; 
Mattsson & Jenelius, 2015). 
Despite much progress in conceptualizing and 
assessing resilience, significant knowledge gaps 
remain, especially concerning the management of 
IS resilience. As stated by Linkov et al. (2014) 
“resilience, as a property of a system, must transi-
tion from just a buzzword to an operational para-
digm for system management.” Alderson, Brown, 
and Carlyle (2015) also argued that resilience 
should be connected to the operational details of 
the system, so that proposed system changes and 
decisions can be naturally evaluated and actually 
implemented for system resilience improvement. 
In this sense, the science of resilience must evolve 
towards developing systems-level methods and 
tools for dealing with “unknown unknowns” in 
cost-efficient ways that provide a guide on how to 
identify and implement resilience-enhancing 
measures and actions. 
To this end, some researchers have recently ad-
dressed the problem of supporting resilience-ori-
ented decision-making mainly from the perspec-
tive of optimization. These studies can be catego-
rized under two main lines: i) pre-disruption in-
vestment optimization (Alderson et al., 2015; 
Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón, & Wood, 2006; Fang, 
Pedroni, & Zio, 2015; Fang & Sansavini, 2017b; 
Ouyang & Fang, 2017), aiming at enhancing IS 
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resilience via optimum preventive measures, e.g. 
hardening and upgrading vulnerable components 
or deploying redundancy before a specific disrup-
tive event strikes the system, and ii) post-event 
emergency response and recovery planning (Fang 
& Sansavini, 2017a, 2019; Lee II, Mitchell, & 
Wallace, 2007), which aims at mitigating system 
loss through emergency responses right after dis-
ruptions and, then, restoring a system to normal 
operation as quickly and efficiently as possible, 
e.g., through optimum resource allocation and 
task scheduling. However, these approaches fall 
short of accounting for the relations and coordina-
tion of IS resilience measures at different stages, 
e.g., trade-offs may exist between different stages 
and thus lack a holistic view of resilience manage-
ment (RM).  
To bridge this gap, the present paper proposes 
a multistage decision making perspective to ad-
dress important open questions in resilience engi-
neering. Specifically, we formulate a set of gen-
eral structures of the multi-stage optimization 
problems under uncertainty for the RM of ISs 
when different uncertainty representations and 
risk attitudes are accounted for. Also, we discuss 
how the decision rule methods can be harnessed 
to overcome the curse of the computational com-
plexity of the proposed problems and to derive op-
erationally implementable policies. 
The remainder of the present paper proceeds as 
follows. In Section 2, we discuss how the problem 
of RM can be modeled from a multistage decision 
making perspective and present two different 
models when different risk preferences are con-
sidered. We introduce a simple class of decision 
rules (DRs), i.e., the linear decision rules (LDRs), 
in Section 3. An exemplary problem is presented 
and studied in Section 4, and the conclusions are 
provided in Section 5. 
2. RM of ISs 
Resilience of ISs concerns a dynamic process 
which is the outcome of a complicated interplay 
between the physical changes, due to damages in-
duced by the disruptive event, and the decisions 
of a mix of humans (e.g., owners, operators, man-
agers) and autonomous “agents” (e.g., monitoring 
systems, feedback controllers). Henceforth, we 
refer to this collective decision-making entity as 
the “decision maker (DM)” of the IS. 
IS RM can be regarded as a process of exploit-
ing the DM’s decisions, usually via coordinated 
and economical applications of resources, to en-
hance the resilience of the IS of interest. Table 1 
presents some typical IS resilience-enhancement 
actions/strategies, associated with their times 
(when the action is made) and effects (how it 
helps to enhance resilience). It can be seen that the 
strategies can be either ex-ante, ex-post or even 
during the occurrence of a disruptive event. They 
make resilience improvement possible by aiding 
failure mitigation, or accelerating the recovery 
process, or the combination of the two. For exam-
ple, deploying distributed backup generators in 
power systems makes it possible to maintain some 
basic level of local electricity service in the event 
of a bulk supply failure or emergency. Moreover, 
these distributed generators may also be used to 
re-energize the bulk network and, thus, speed up 
the system recovery process (Gholami, Aminifar, 
& Shahidehpour, 2016). Given that the budget is 
always limited in practice, the most cost-effective 
approach requires optimum planning of the resili-
ence actions/strategies, and trade-offs to balance 
current investment in failure mitigation with 
spending needed for recovery and adaptive capac-
ity. Moreover, the consequences of the decisions 
on the resilience actions usually extend well into 
the future and, thus, inevitably their outcomes are 
affected by significant uncertainty: types and 
characteristics of disruptive events, levels of sys-
tem damages, available resources for system res-
toration and unforeseen delays in repair tasks all 
have a bearing on the suitability of these deci-
sions.
Table 1. Examples of actions/strategies for resilience enhancement.
Actions/Strategies Stage Effect 
Failure mitigation Recovery acceleration 
Identify and protect/reinforce key components 
Ex-ante 
  
Deploy spares (backup subsystems)   
Deploy advanced technology for system monitoring and 
assessment 
 
Preposition repair resources   
Train staff and managers to increase risk awareness    
Emergency response (e.g., failure isolation, structure 
modification) During 
  
Optimally schedule the repair tasks and allocate repair 
resources 
Ex-post   
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Fig. 1. Timeline indicating the flow of information and content of actions taken in RM of ISs
2.1 RM as a Problem of Multistage Decision 
Making under Uncertainty 
Fig. 1 illustrates a typical timeline of flow of in-
formation and content of actions taken in RM of 
ISs potentially exposed to extreme disruptive 
events. All the features have been included in a 
general framework of multistage decision making 
under uncertainty:  
Stage 1: Before the occurrence of a disruptive 
event, the DM makes decisions on in-
vestment in ex-ante resilience ac-
tions/strategies, such as those listed in 
Table 1, knowing his/her own risk pref-
erence (e.g., risk-aversion or risk-neu-
tral) and maybe historical data about spe-
cific types of events (e.g., earthquakes). 
Decisions in this stage are usually re-
ferred to as here-and-now and they have 
to be made under multiple uncertainties 
about future stages. 
Stage 2: During or right after the occurrence of 
the event and given that some infor-
mation about the event (e.g., location and 
magnitude) is known (e.g., through mon-
itoring, self-awareness and communica-
tion technologies), emergency response 
actions like system reconfiguration and 
failure isolation might be implemented 
for failure mitigation. 
Stage 3: When the system is no longer impacted 
by the event and enters into a stable (dis-
rupted) state, inspection and damage as-
sessment can be conducted to support the 
DM decisions on how to restore the sys-
tem, e.g., to select an initial restoration 
plan.  
Stage 4…T: The initial restoration plan might be 
adjusted stage-wise whenever some un-
certain sources are realized, e.g., the fin-
ished repair tasks take longer time than 
expected or new repair resources are 
available.  
In some cases, interventions might not be pos-
sible in some stages. In a multistage decision 
making setting, the uncertainty sources are re-
vealed gradually over time. Nonanticipativity of 
the DM’s actions requires that the decisions made 
at the beginning of stage  depend only on the in-
formation on uncertain parameters realized up to 
the beginning of stage. In other words, the DM 
has no crystal ball that can reveal any determinis-
tic information from the future. 
In the following section, we present in details 
the mathematical formulation of the multistage 
decision making problems.  
2.2 Mathematical Formulation 
A DM first observes an uncertain parameter  
and, then, makes a decision from a set of 
feasible decisions. Subsequently, a second un-
certain parameter 	  is revealed, in response to 
which the DM takes a second decision 
	
 	  	. This sequence of alternating ob-
servations and decisions extends over   stage, 
where at any stage   
 
  the DM observes 
an uncertain parameter   and selects a decision 

  
    . Note that   and   are both 
vectors and, thus, they can represent multiple 
sources of uncertainty and different actions, re-
spectively. Besides, we can simply set    for 
deterministic here-and-now decisions when no 
uncertainty is observed at the first stage. To sim-
plify the notation, we define the history of the un-
certainty realization up to stage   as  

  
  and the history of selected decisions up 
to stage  as   
  
 . Moreover, we let 
  
  
   and   
  
   denote the 
vector concatenation of all uncertain parameters 
and all decisions variables, respectively. 
For an IS of interest, let  
  denote a 
function that quantifies its performance at stage  
that results from all the decision choices and un-
certainty realizations up to  . Then, the overall 
system performance in the studied horizon 
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
 can be measured based on a sequence of 
performance functions  
 
   
 
  . 
In the present paper, we simply assume 

     
 


 
(1)
Then, the DM’s goal in RM is to select the func-
tions or decision rules (DRs) 
  
  , 
which map observation histories to decisions, 
such that the overall system performance
  
is maximized while all the decisions are feasible. 
The problem is represented as follows. 
 
     
 


 
s.t.    
    
   
 
  
(!)
where   denotes the set of all possible uncertain 
scenarios. Typically  is infinite and problem ! 
accommodates infinitely many decision variables. 
Moreover, the objective 
  relies on the real-
ization of uncertain scenario and, thus, is inher-
ently stochastic.  
Below, we present in details the formulations 
of more tractable versions of problem ! by taking 
into account the DM’s risk preferences, i.e., risk-
neutral or risk-aversion. 
2.2.1 Stochastic Program 
If the distribution governing the uncertainty  is 
known and the DM is risk-neutral, then it is pos-
sible and reasonable to maximize the expected 
value of the overall system performance. Thus, 
problem !  converts to the following multistage 
stochastic program. 
"# $  
 


% 
s.t.    
    
   
 
  
(&!)
where "# denotes expectation with respect to 
the random parameter .  
For its computational tractability, problem &! 
is typically simplified into a deterministic struc-
ture by reducing the uncertainty set   to a finite 
subset of suitable size through scenario sampling 
and reduction techniques (Dupaová, Gröwe-
Kuska, & Römisch, 2003; Fang & Sansavini, 
2019). 
2.2.2 Robust Optimization Problem 
In practice, the expected value is often a poor 
choice of measure for risk-informed decisions 
particularly for ISs resilience against catastrophic 
events (Alderson et al., 2015). In other words, 
risk-aversion is a more advocated attitude in IS 
RM. Moreover, the uncertainty  may be simply 
unknown to the DM. In these situations, the DM 
may want to consider the worst-case system per-
formance, where the worst case (minimum perfor-
mance) is evaluated with respect to all possible 
scenarios   . This results in the following for-
mulation of a general multistage (adaptive) robust 
optimization. 
'(#) $  
 


% 
s.t.    
    
   
 
  
(*!)
Practically solving problem *!  (and &!) re-
quires explicit expressions of  
  ,  
and  , which all depend on the specific IS of in-
terest. In Section 4, we will demonstrate how to 
apply the *! model to a notional commodity dis-
tribution network.  
3. The Linear Decision Rule Approximation 
The decision rules, or implementable policies, are 
the functions 
  
  that map (historical) 
uncertainties data  to decisions. The concept of 
DRs was proposed to alleviate the curse of dimen-
sionality of multistage stochastic programs 
(Georghiou, Wiesemann, & Kuhn, 2015; Kuhn, 
Wiesemann, & Georghiou, 2011). It restricts the 
admissible recourse decisions to some specific 
function forms, e.g., linear, segregated linear, 
piecewise linear and algebraic as well as trigono-
metric polynomial, of the observed uncertain pa-
rameter values to obtain a good approximation to 
the optimal solution of the multistage problem 
(Georghiou, Kuhn, & Wiesemann, 2018). Such an 
approach is in line with Simon’s view that human 
decision agents may tend to rely on heuristic rules 
to achieve a stated satisfactory level of perfor-
mance when operating under complex and uncer-
tain environments (Simon, 1972). Also, with DRs 
there is no need for dynamic re-optimization dur-
ing the time-sensitive planning horizon, particu-
larly during the emergency response and system 
restoration phases. Moreover, a generic DR repre-
sented by simple functions has an advantage in 
that they are practical and intuitive for DMs to use 
in operation. As such, the present paper advocates 
the usage of DR approaches for handling the com-
putational complexity of multistage stochastic 
and robust optimization models.  
LDRs are a simple but effective class of DRs 

   
 
   that are linearly dependent on 
the observed uncertainty history . LDRs have 
been proven to optimally solve the linear quad-
ratic regulator problem, a class of one-dimen-
sional robust control problems, and two stage ro-
bust vehicle routing problems (Georghiou et al., 
2018). The LDRs can be expressed as 
  + (2)
for some matrix + with proper dimensions. Then, 
substituting these LDRs into problems &!  and 
3386 Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference
*!  yields their approximate problems that are 
amenable to numerical solutions. The forms of the 
solutions are also easy to use in operations since 
they are linear combinations of the observed un-
certainty realizations.  
4. Notional Example 
This section presents a simple example involving 
a notional IS adopted from Alderson et al. (2015), 
which is designed to distribute some commodity 
to different locations within an urban area. As 
shown in Fig. 2, there are 2 suppliers (black cir-
cles) and 14 demand locations (white circles) in 
this distribution network. Commodity flow is car-
ried by links that are bidirectional and have a lim-
ited capacity. Assume that the demand at each de-
mand location is 1, that the supply at each supply 
is 10 and that each link has a flow capacity of 5. 
Assume the operator faces a penalty of €10 per 
flow unit and per hour for each node that does not 
receive its demand and a per-unit transmit cost of 
€1/hour for each link. Then, the objective of the 
DM for the system is to route the available flows 
in order to minimize the sum of all the transmis-
sion costs and penalty costs for the system.  
 
Fig. 2. A notional distribution network 
The DM’s task is complicated by the fact that 
the capacities of one or more links in the system 
can be damaged by disruptive events. To improve 
the system resilience, the DM’s (pre-event) 
measures include i) protecting a link so that it is 
invulnerable to loss, and ii) prepositioning certain 
amount of repair resources at a depot so that they 
can be used for the restoration of affected links in 
the system (see Fig. 2). After the occurrence of a 
failure event, the DM assigns the available repair 
resources to the affected links in an optimum way 
so that the system performance (the minimum 
cost of commodity flow) is recovered as soon as 
possible. For simplicity, we assume that the re-
covery speeds of damaged links depend linearly 
on the allocated resources. By adopting a risk-
aversion attitude and considering the worst case 
disruption, the integrated RM problem for this no-
tional infrastructure system is formally formu-
lated as an *! in Section 4.1. 
4.1 Problem formulation 
'(
,
-
./

#)
0
 1
   (3)
s.t. 2 345 657 385491 : ; (4) 
5  <=
>
 1 ? = (5) 
2 +557 : 1
   (6) 
  @  =
A7AB 2  C 557 : DE  (7) 
0
 1
   '(
F
G
H8I
2 2  57
5 6 2 =  HJKKL   
(8) 
I  <M
 
 HJA= : HJK : JNK 
 
 
= : MK : MOK 
 
 
MK C 2 557A9PK 6
2 557A8PK  JNK C HJK 
 
  
A5A : N5 5 6 N55 6 Q  +5  
C 5
 R
 
A5A : N5 
 R
 E 
(9) 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
(13) 
The objective of the RM problem (3) is to min-
imize the worst-case system cost 0
 1
  un-
der all possible failure scenarios by investing in 
link protection5, repair resources prepositioning 
1 and assignment+5. It is noted that here +5 
represents the amount of repair resources assigned 
to link R. It is an adjustable decision variable and 
is modeled through the LDRs introduced in Sec-
tion 3. Constraint (4) sets the total investment 
budget B. Constraint (5) imposes the nature and 
lower bound of decision variables 5 and 1. Con-
straint (6) puts the limit for the total amount of as-
signed repair resources. The uncertainty set of 
system failure scenarios is given by (7), where 5 
represents the residual capacity [%] of link e and 
the parameter D controls the magnitude of the fail-
ure. (8)-(13) represents the operational model of 
the system after a disruption. Specifically, con-
straints (9) and (10) impose the upper limits of un-
met demand HJK  and supply MK , respectively. 
Constraint (11) represents the flow balance at 
each node. Constraints (12) and (13) enforce the 
capacity limit for each link. Importantly, con-
straint (12) states that if a link is protected5   
and its capacity will always be its original level 
N5; otherwise, its capacity depends on its residual 
capacity 5 in the failure scenario and the repair 
speed Q  +5, where Q is the repair rate of link ca-
pacity, i.e., the percentage of capacity that can be 
restored per unit of repair resources and per repair 
time period. 
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With the LDRs approach, the formulated prob-
lem (3)-(13) is relatively tractable compared to its 
multistage counterpart (Georghiou et al., 2015) 
and can be solved using state-of-the-art MIP solv-
ers like CPLEX. 
4.2 Numerical Results 
Fig. 3 shows the results of the RM objective, i.e., 
the cumulative system cost during the failure hori-
zon, under different values of investment budget 
B and failure magnitude D for a repair rateQ 
=ST. It is clearly shown that the system cost grows 
monotonically with the increase of the failure 
magnitude, which, fortunately, can be mitigated 
by increasing the investments in link protection 
and repair resource prepositioning. With each ad-
ditional investment in these resilience measures, 
the system cost vs. failure magnitude D curve be-
comes less steep,indicating improved operational 
resilience for the system. 
 
Fig. 3. Cumulative system cost under different values of in-
vestment budget ; and failure magnitude D for Q  =ST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cumulative system cost and protection & recovery in-
vestment under different values of link repair rate Q for (a) 
;  U, D  T, (b) ;  V, D  T, (c) ;  W, D  T, (d) ; 
U, D  U, (e) ;  V, D  U, and (f) ;  W, D  U 
Fig. 4(a)-(f) show the results of the cumulative 
system costs, the investments in link protection 
(protection invest) and the investments in prepo-
sitioning repair resources (recovery invest) along 
with different values of link repair rate Q for dif-
ferent cases of B and D. As expected, high values 
of the link repair rate Q generally result in reduced 
cumulative system costs in all the cases (a)-(f), 
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representing more resilient infrastructure systems. 
Moreover, it can be observed in Fig. 4(a)-(f) that 
the optimum solutions tend to make more invest-
ments in protecting critical links than in preposi-
tioning repair resources for small values of the re-
pair rateQ; when Q increases, the optimum solu-
tions shift to invest more in placing repair re-
sources in the depot while reducing the protection 
investment (the total investment keeps unchanged 
for each case). In other words, clear trade-offs ex-
ist between the expenditure of pre-event link pro-
tection and the investment in repair resources 
preparation for different values of link repair rate. 
5. Conclusions 
Resilience needs to develop towards an opera-
tional paradigm for system management. In this 
view, the present paper proposes a multistage de-
cision making perspective on resilience manage-
ment problems. By taking into account different 
uncertainty representations and risk attitudes, a 
set of general structures of the multi-stage optimi-
zation problems (i.e.,! &!, *!) have been for-
mulated for the resilience management of infra-
structure systems. 
 Although the formulated problems are usually 
very challenging to be solved, the general DR ap-
proaches can be used to alleviate the computa-
tional burden. A generic DR represented by sim-
ple functions is practical and intuitive for DMs to 
use in operation. Also, by using DRs, there is no 
need for dynamic re-optimization during the time-
sensitive emergency response and system restora-
tion phases. In the present paper, we introduce the 
simplest but effective LDRs and demonstrates its 
effectiveness through a simple infrastructure case 
study.  
To demonstrate the application of our proposed 
framework, along with supporting analytic tech-
niques, a simple example of a notional infrastruc-
ture has been considered. We illustrate how the 
resilience improvement problem for the system 
can be formulated as a multistage robust optimi-
zation by adopting a risk-aversion attitude and 
considering the worst case failure scenarios. The 
results clearly show the trade-offs and coordina-
tion of the resilience decisions at different stages. 
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